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ABSTRACT
Biological agents  can be  highly contagious 
and fatal,  requiring a timely response to 
avoid economic loss, loss  of life and large-
scale panic.  Local mass  prophylaxis  plans 
are based on the concept of Points  of 
Dispensing (POD).  However,  there  are 
various challenges  that the local health 
department (LHD) in large metropolitan 
areas  may encounter.  We examine the 
benefits and challenges of POD and 
proposed alternate  modes of dispensing. 
Considering that resources will always be 
under pressure,  LHD will need to conduct 
analyses to  determine what are the best 
alternate modes  of dispensing for their 
jurisdiction.  As  a starting point, each LHD 
should consider what aspects of their POD 
plan are most in need of supplementation – 
sites, security,  staffing, throughput, 
locations, etc.  – so that the relative 
importance of addressing the different 
criteria becomes clearer.  Tools  from  the  field 
of decision analysis  can facilitate  the 
analysis  and subsequent discussion 
necessary to make a well-informed choice.
INTRODUCTION
In  this paper  we examine Points of 
Dispensing  (POD) and proposed alternate 
modes of dispensing  for  oral prophylaxis 
from  the perspective of a  local heath 
department (LHD) in a  large metropolitan 
area.  We include this geographic  focus as the 
challenges LHD will encounter  in  rural  or 
sparsely  populated areas will most likely  be 
different from  those seen  in large urban areas 
with  a densely  concentrated population.  After 
presenting each mode of dispensing  and its 
potential benefits and challenges, we 
summarize the choice facing  the LHD and 
provide recommendations for  enhanced 
planning. It  is important  for  homeland 
security  planning  to consider  the realistic 
limitations of each  of the potential  modes of 
dispensing  and to explore options to 
supplement  this system.   To choose among 
the options,  it is necessary  to evaluate the 
benefits that  each  has to offer  in  alleviating 
the need for  resources that are scarce within 
the community. 
Start ing  with  President Cl inton’s 
Executive Order  12938 in 1994,  the funding 
for  bioterrorism  initiatives has increased 
significantly.1  Ten  years later, in  2004, 
President  George W.  Bush  signed Homeland 
Security  Presidential Directive 10 to 
strengthen  the nation’s preparedness and 
defense against  the use of biological  and 
chemical weapons.2  Effective on  March  1, 
2003,  the National Pharmaceutical  Stockpile 
became the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS) and serves as a  national  repository  of 
antibiotics, chemical  antidotes, antitoxins, 
vaccines,  medical equipment, and supplies to 
combat "Category  A" Threat  Agents as 
defined by  the Centers for  Disease Control 
and Prevention  (CDC). 3  The mission  of the 
SNS is to help state and local jurisdictions 
prepare a  strategic  and uniform  response to a 
large-scale natural disaster  or  an act  of 
terrorism.4  It  is the responsibility  of local 
health  departments to dispense SNS assets 
within  their  jurisdiction  – the SNS does not 
provide dispensing team  personnel, facilities, 
or  transportation  support  beyond the delivery 
of the supplies to a  state-identified receiving 
site.5 
Local mass prophylaxis plans are based on 
the concept  of Points of Dispensing (POD)  as 
a  mechanism  for  dispensing medicine and 
medical supplies to the general population 
d u r i n g  a  l a r g e - s c a l e p u b l i c  h e a l t h 
emergency. 6 Although the POD-based model 
has shortcomings, the CDC and the 
Department of Health and Human  Services 
(DHHS) still view  POD as the cornerstone of 
dispensing  during  a  bioterrorism  event 
requiring  oral prophylaxis. 7  The CDC 
Division  of the Strategic  National Stockpile 
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(DSNS) requires project  areas to complete 
three of seven  DSNS drills; of these, four  are 
directly  related to POD activation,  set-up, 
and throughput  and complete one functional 
or  full scale exercise  for  each Cities Readiness 
Initiative Metropolitan  Statistical Area  (MSA) 
that tests key  components of mass 
prophylaxis plans.8  These tests must be 
completed within  each Public  Health 
Emergency  Preparedness Grant  year 
(typically  August 10,  20XX – August  9,  20XX 
+ 1).   Failure to meet  these benchmarks could 
result  in  withholding  of funds or  future 
funding under the Pandemic  and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act (PAHPA). 9 
The Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI),  a 
part of the SNS,  was established to enhance 
preparedness in  the nation’s largest  cities. 
Through  CRI,  state and cities are  required to 
develop plans in  order  to provide antibiotics 
to the entire population  within  their 
jurisdiction  within  forty-eight  hours.10  This 
timeframe provides the optimum  benefit  of 
post-exposure prophylaxis among  those 
people who have inhaled anthrax spores. 11 
While there have been  no incidents 
requiring  mass prophylaxis using  the medical 
emergency  model, the recent  set of 
vaccination  efforts in response to the H1N1 
influenza outbreaks indicated that there are 
serious gaps in  public  health  personnel, 
personnel available to administer  vaccines, 
locations for  the administration  of the 
intervention, and necessary  medical supplies. 
A  public health  emergency  requiring 
activation  of POD for  immediate  life-saving 
interventions will operate under  different 
rules and regulations but  will probably 
encounter the same resourcing issues.
POINTS OF DISPENSING
The CDC recommends that POD be sites the 
community  is familiar with  such  as sports 
arenas,  convention  centers,  community 
centers, and,  in  some cases, schools. These 
facilities are usually  located in areas with 
high  population  density  and easy  access, 
ample parking,  and close to public 
transportation  facilities.12 Such  facilities also 
provide secondary  advantages such as a large 
space (with  available  floor  plans that denote 
all  rooms,  entrances,  and exits); familiarity  of 
local law  enforcement  with  securing  the 
facility; and climate control  (especially 
important in  areas with  extreme weather 
conditions). POD are typically  non-clinical 
sites to ensure that  treatment centers would 
be able to continue treating  their  existing 
pat ients as we l l as anyone who i s 
symptomatic or  injured during  the course of 
t h e e m e r g e n c y . M a s s p r o p h y l a x i s 
coordination  requires advance planning  and 
integration of staffing,  security,  traffic, and 
control  plans to successfully  respond to an 
incident. 13
Response p lanning  based on  the 
traditional POD has many  advantages. It is 
easily  scalable so the number  of POD opened 
can  be commensurate with the actual 
incident.  It  is open to the entire population 
(i.e.,  there are no restrictions on  who may 
obtain  prophylaxis from  a POD). Several 
exercises in the United States have tested 
POD models and many  jurisdictions use 
exercise data  to justify  their  POD efficiency, 
as required under  the Pandemic and All 
Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA).14 Of all 
the alternate modes of dispensing,  the 
traditional POD has undergone the most 
frequent  and rigorous testing,  even  though 
criticisms have been leveled at  the testing for 
failing  to: include set-up times; include 
elements of uncertainty; include the 
interaction  with  security  or  law  enforcement; 
use fu l l  secur i ty  s ta f f ing; and test 
coordination  between  POD, the Receipt, 
Store,  and Stage (RSS)  Warehouse and the 
Command Center. 15
One disadvantage of the POD approach  is 
that  special  needs populations may  not be 
able to wait  in long  lines for  hours to receive 
their  medications, a frequent  feature of 
POD.16  No acceptable standard approach  – 
such  as an  extra  line for  those with  special 
needs or immediate priority  service for 
special-needs individuals – has been  found to 
resolve these issues. These alternative 
solutions will  require extra  staff (either 
additional staff or  staff borrowed from 
current POD operations), as well as extra  set-
up for  expedited processing, monitoring, 
security, and controls at  the POD sites – all  of 
which  affect  POD efficiency.  In  addition, 
there are the ethical  considerations for  both 
population  groups (general and special 
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needs) in  terms of waiting  times,  priority, and 
access.17 
The Bioterrorism  and Epidemic Outbreak 
Response Model (BERM) estimates that in  an 
anthrax scenario, assuming  twelve-hour work 
shifts (with  a  downtime of 15  percent)  and a 
throughput  of 1,200  people per  minute, 348 
POD would be required to process a 
population  of 10 million  in  order  to 
prophylax  everyone in  forty-eight  hours. 18 
Due to local variations of POD design  and 
patient  flow  plans, staff requirements differ 
between  jurisdictional POD models. Using 
the staffing  determined by  the BERM model, 
if all  348 POD are activated, Los Angeles 
County  Department of Public Health  would 
require 8,352  clinical staff and 41,760  non-
clinical staff.  
In  a  large scale incident  where the full 
population needs prophylactic  services,  site 
and staffing  requirements reveal the 
disadvantages of the POD system. A  first 
issue is whether or  not there are sufficient 
adequate sites within  the geographic 
boundaries of an  LHD to serve as POD that 
have not  been  designated to serve other 
emergency  needs such  as a  shelter  or 
alternate medical care site. In  addition  to the 
sheer  physical  number  of POD sites, 
memoranda of understanding need to be 
developed and signed with  each  site owner 
that  address the site owner’s concerns about 
liability,  damage to the site,  and potential 
future ramifications to the facility  associated 
with  its use during the bioterrorism  event. 
Given  the complex structures of government 
organizations and their  relationships with  the 
private sector, this will take time and a 
considerable amount of effort. 
A  second set  of issues surrounds the 
staffing  requirements needed for  a large 
metropolitan  area  (e.g.,  the  need for  over 
8,000 clinical staff and almost  42,000 non-
clinical  staff in  Los Angeles County).   These 
staffing  requirements are not  unique to Los 
Angeles.  The CDC guidance for  dispensing 
site operations suggests that  metropolitan 
public health  agencies may  have to train 
thousands of people to meet  the key 
dispensing  site personnel needs,19  and that 
identifying  and training  these personnel  in 
adequate numbers poses a problem. 20
Staffing to these levels will  be dependent 
on  volunteers. 21 This implies that the LHD or 
some other  public  agency  must  have a 
volunteer  procurement  arm  dedicated to 
recruiting  volunteers and setting  up 
registries,  prior  to an  emergency,  that can 
pre-register, pre-credential clinical  staff,  and 
ideally  pre-train  non-clinical POD staff – a 
time-consuming  and expensive process. This 
represents a  serious additional workload at a 
time when  most  LHD are understaffed to run 
their  daily  functions and public  agencies face 
serious budget  cuts.22  Contacting,  training, 
and transporting this number of volunteers to 
the POD sites is practically  infeasible, 
especially  as the CDC strongly  recommends 
that  al l dispensing  sites be opened 
simultaneously  to avoid panic or the 
perception  of preferential  treatment. 23  The 
sheer  number  of volunteers poses difficulties 
in  obtaining  and maintaining  up-to-date lists 
with  current, accurate contact information. 
Beyond obtaining the volunteers, they  must 
be dispatched to the various functioning  POD 
sites.  
Several exercises in  Los Angles County 
found that  volunteers arriving  spontaneously 
at  POD sites without  prior  coordination 
would negatively  influence POD operations 
as personnel  are pulled from  their  primary 
tasks to handle the unexpected volunteers. In 
addition,  if there is no pre-planned staging 
area  for  staff to gather,  “flocking” at 
undesirable locations – such  as POD, 
hospitals and other  healthcare facilities – can 
occur,24  resulting  in  compromised care, 
uncoordinated staffing efforts,  and over- or 
under-staffing.  The exercises concluded that 
coordination  of volunteer personnel and a 
pre-designated staging  area  are essential and 
will need to be staffed by  LHD personnel.25 
Given  the need for large numbers of non-
clinical  staff,  training  will be done on a  just-
in-time basis.  Numerous tools for  this 
purpose have been  made publicly  available 
through  the National association  of Country 
and City  Health  Officials. 26  Training  is vital. 
Volunteers need to be familiarized with the 
POD setup and operations; without  a  clear 
understanding  of the POD flow  and layout, 
POD efficiency  will  be negatively  affected. 27 
Administering this training  will  require time 
and manpower, a  task that will  likely  also fall 
to the LHD. This implies that  during  an 
emergency,  in  addition  to setting  up the POD 
at  their  locations,  LHD staff will  need to 
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contact  volunteers, provide just-in-time 
t r a i n i n g ,  a n d c o o r d i n a t e v o l u n t e e r 
distribution among POD. 
Training has been  found to be an  essential 
step for  all individuals associated with  POD 
functioning. Breakdowns in  communication 
and logistics,  such  as an  inability  to order 
supplies or  report  problems,  can  result in 
diminished POD efficiency.28  The slower  a 
POD works,  the more POD will be needed to 
meet the prophylaxis mandates,  increasing 
the need for  sites and personnel.  Additional 
training on the need and necessity  of 
complying  with  personal  protect ive 
equipment  (PPE) guidelines will be required. 
Without training and fit-testing  volunteers, 
POD staff is not  likely  to adhere to the 
guidelines. 29 
Clinical  staff pose additional challenges 
since many  medical volunteers who would 
normally  be willing  and able to volunteer, 
such  as hospital doctors and nurses, fire 
d e p a r t m e n t p e r s o n n e l ,  E M T , a n d 
paramedics, may  have other  duties at  their 
primary  places of employment  that  take 
priority  during a  medical emergency.  Many  of 
these medical volunteers also participate in 
other  community  organizations such  as 
Community  Emergency  Response Teams 
(CERT), Disaster  Medical Assistance Teams 
(DMAT),  California  Medical Assistance 
Teams (CalMAT),  etc.   Another, almost 
opposite issue, has been documented as well. 
Several studies have found public health  and 
medical professionals reluctant to participate 
in  the response to a  biological attack or  a 
pandemic influenza  outbreak.30  The actual 
number  of medical volunteers responding  to 
an incident may be far less than planned.
Finally,  the number  of volunteers needed 
to maintain  round-the-clock  dispensing 
operations may  be higher  than estimated. 
The original estimates supplied by  the BERM 
model are based on  the assumption  that 
workers would be willing  to stay  for  twelve-
hour  shifts.  As discussed in  Trust for 
America’s Health, 31  there are many  reasons 
why  twelve-hour  shifts may  be unattainable – 
in  which case the number  of volunteers 
needed increases.
A  third set of issues surround the ability  to 
provide security  for  the POD – both  the 
security  at  the site as well  as traffic  control 
issues. POD are large facilities that  will 
attract a  large number  of people; as such, 
they  provide terrorists with  an “optimal” 
combination  of mass casualty  and mass 
media  exposure.  They  should therefore be 
considered a  high-value,  high-payoff target.32 
Security  is also needed for  the transport  of 
prophylactic  materials and to direct  and 
manage the flow  of traffic at  each  of the 
sites. 33  Additional issues may  arise when 
there are multiple law  enforcement 
jurisdictions within  a  large metropolitan 
area.  It is necessary  to identify  one central 
coordinator  for  all  of the jurisdictions,  who 
each  of the agencies will  accept  – a  task that 
has proven  difficult.34  While security  is not 
within  the purview  of the LHD, the ability  of 
a  city  or  county  to supply  the requisite 
security  personnel is frequently  limited. 
Security  personnel must  be used to preserve 
the functioning  of civil  society  during  the 
emergency.  Unfortunately,  police forces have 
been cut  in  these times of budgetary 
difficulties and many  jurisdictions are 
starting  to rely  on  volunteers.35  The LHD 
must  take into account  the security 
implications of its mass prophylaxis 
programs to ensure they  will be feasible 
within the security constraints of its area.
Most  large LHD concede they  will  not be 
able to set  up and operate all POD at  once 
and that POD would be opened based on 
availability  of staffing  and security  resources. 
This implies that more POD would eventually 
need to open  to be able to “make-up”  the lost 
time and still  be able to prophylax the entire 
population  within the forty-eight-hour 
window.
ALTERNATE MODES OF 
DISPENSING 
Alternate methods of dispensing are meant  to 
complement  POD as they  reduce the number 
of people who need to be moved through 
POD. 36  The CDC recommends several 
alternate modes of dispensing  shown  to be 
best  practices (there are several other 
alternate modes of dispensing  that are 
regularly  discussed on  the SNS listserv 
hosted by  the CDC). Some are based on  the 
“open”  model  (anyone may  rece ive 
prophylaxis) and others on  the “closed” 
model (prophylaxis is only  available to a 
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specific subpopulation).  The CDC states that 
in  order  to create robust  alternate modes of 
dispensing, the LHD needs to first  identify 
the population  that it  would serve, research 
the availability  of resources, and create a 
strong partnership with  stakeholders such  as 
local  law  enforcement,  medical reserves 
corps, CERT networks, the Red Cross, and 
those organizations that  would be partners in 
the alternate mode of dispensing  (businesses, 
schools/universities,  retail  pharmacies, 
health  maintenance organizations,  other 
government  agencies,  etc.).37  Not  all of the 
alternatives will  be feasible in  every 
jurisdiction. Therefore, early  assessment and 
analysis is critical to designing  a  plan  to 
supplement the traditional POD system.
PRE-POSITIONING MEDICATIONS
Prepositioning  can be used for  first 
responders and/or  for hospital  and medical 
staff and/or  for  all  government employees 
and their  families.  The CDC guidance is that 
these preferences (early  treatment  for  first 
responders) need to have been discussed 
openly  within  the community.38 Prophylactic 
drugs can  be purchased using  funding from 
the Urban  Area  Security  Initiative (UASI)  or 
Metropolitan Medical Response System 
(MMRS) to stockpile medications for  first 
responders; funds from  CDC can  be used to 
purchase drugs for public  health  emergency 
response personnel;  and funds from  the 
Health  Resource and Services Administration 
(HRSA) can  be used for  hospitals. The most 
important step in  setting  up a  pre-positioning 
operation  is to coordinate plans between 
LHD and other  local  government  agencies 
and hospitals. The LHD would be responsible 
for  writing  and managing grants and 
ensuring  that the drugs are rotated before 
they  expire.  In  the case of an  emergency, the 
partner  agency  would be responsible for 
picking  up and dispensing  the drugs. If the 
drugs were to be pre-deployed to the agencies 
t h e m s e l v e s , t h e n  i t  w o u l d b e t h e 
responsibility  of the agency  accepting  the 
drugs to maintain  their  cache under  strict 
supervision  of the LHD. No agency  would be 
allowed to distribute drugs without the 
consent  of the Public Health Officer  of the 
L H D .  A  s i g n e d m e m o r a n d u m  o f 
understanding  (MOU) would be required 
between  agencies detailing  the maintenance 
of the cache and the requirements and 
responsibilities of both agencies.  The LHD 
w o u l d b e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r  e n s u r i n g 
compliance with  the policies of the program 
and would therefore need to create a  registry 
for  all  personnel working  for  each partner 
agency.  The registry  would include all 
locations of the drugs,  the quantity  of drugs, 
and contact  information  for  the personnel 
responsible  for  dispensing at  the partner 
agency.
An important  advantage of prepositioning 
is that personnel required for  mass 
prophylaxis and medical  response would 
receive the required prophylaxis ahead of 
time, before the SNS arrives,  which  would 
ensure that  once the SNS becomes available 
personnel are at  work and ready  to distribute 
it  to the public. Additionally, the security 
requirements for pre-positioning  are 
generally  deemed as low; all  that  is needed 
is a  locked,  secure area  with  oversight  by 
licensed personnel and a  means to limit 
access to authorized personnel only.  Another 
advantage is that these individuals and their 
immediate family  members will not need to 
go to the POD.39  If the drugs are  stored at 
each  agency,  then  during  an  emergency  no 
LHD staff is required. If the drugs are stored 
at  a  central warehouse,  then  only  warehouse 
s ta f f ing i s required for  d ispens ing 
prophylaxis.  
The main  disadvantage to pre-positioning 
is that  the initial set-up can  be time 
consuming,  as it requires buy-in  from  the 
p a r t n e r  a g e n c i e s ( h o s p i t a l s , o t h e r 
g o v e r n m e n t a l  d e p a r t m e n t s , o t h e r 
government agencies).40  The rights, 
responsibilities,  and liabilities of these 
partners must be agreed upon  – issues which 
become more complicated if the partners are 
p r o v i d e d w i t h  t h e i r  o w n  c a c h e o f 
medications. In addition,  antibiotics have an 
expiration date and would have to be rotated, 
committing the various entities to a 
continuous maintenance program  and 
requiring  reapplication for  grants to fund 
such operations.
DISPENSING AT BUSINESSES 
Local health  departments have forwarded the 
idea  of dispensing  at  businesses,  which  has 
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the potential of benefitting  both  the business 
and the LHD.  If large employers prophylax 
their  own  employees and employee families 
during  a  large health  emergency  that  would 
require activation  of POD,  employees will  be 
encouraged to come to work – a  clear  benefit 
to the private sector.  In  addition  to protecting 
their  own workforce,  private industry  has 
proven  to be extremely  helpful in disaster 
recovery  efforts,  not  only  because businesses 
are citizens of their  own  communities, but 
a l so because wi thout  cont inui ty  o f 
community  no business can  be done.41  The 
much  quoted statement from  Stanley  Weiss, 
one of the founders of Business Executives 
for  National Security  (BENS), is that  “Being 
dead is bad for  business.” 42 From  the LHD 
perspective, the option   of dispensing at 
businesses becomes attractive if it can  reduce 
the number of individuals who will need to 
use the POD system.43  Target  businesses 
include large companies (the Orange County 
Health  Care Agency  defines “large”  as 
businesses that  have 100 employees or  more) 
a n d t h o s e t h a t  d e a l w i t h c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure such  as power,  water,  and 
communications. 
The LHD in  Orange County,  Florida,  has 
had great  success working  with  local 
businesses and obtaining  agreements with 
them  to prophylax their own  employees (in 
effect  serving  as a  closed business POD) with 
their  business POD. The challenge is to 
prophylax  1.6  million  people in Orlando (the 
largest  city  within  Orange County) within 
forty-eight hours.  After establishing 
memoranda of agreement (MOA)  with  large 
employers and medical facilities to prophylax 
their  own  employees and their  families,  the 
department  estimates that  they  can 
prophylax  40  percent  of their  population 
without  recourse to their  traditional POD 
system. 44
A  business POD would require an MOU 
between  the LHD and the private sector 
partner  that  specifies the roles and 
responsibilities of both  agencies.  It  would be 
the responsibility  of the LHD to notify 
business partners about  the activation  of the 
dispensing  plan,  separate and repackage 
medication that  will  be allotted to each 
business,  and create and send forms,  as well 
as notify  a  responsible party  regarding  the 
location  (the distribution  site) and pick-up 
time for the prophylactic  medications.  The 
health  department would also be responsible 
for  training  key  personnel to provide just-in-
time training  to the business POD staff. 
Businesses would be responsible for  picking 
up and dispensing  drugs to their  employees 
with  proper  medical  oversight,  distributing 
forms and information  sheets to their 
employees, setting  up and staffing  a  business 
POD, and returning  all  unused items (along 
with  completed patient forms) to the 
department of health.45
After  an  MOU is signed,  the LHD would 
issue an  authorization letter  to the 
businesses,  and the person  responsible for 
picking  up the medications would have to 
bring this letter  and photo identification  in 
order  to gain  access to the distribution  site. 
Since the location(s) of the pick-up sites for 
businesses would not be publicly  known  nor 
publicized,  the assumption  is that this covert 
approach  would negate the security  threat. 
Large businesses typically  have occupational 
health  nurses on  staff to oversee issues such 
as workers’ compensation  and therefore 
provide medical  oversight; they  may  in  some 
cases choose to contract their  employee 
health  services from  an outside agency  such 
as an  industrial health  clinic or  a  medical 
consultant firm  to come in  during  an 
emergency  and provide for  medical  oversight 
of dispensing.  Nevertheless, businesses may 
be unable to locate medical staff to provide 
proper  dispensing oversight. In  such  cases, 
businesses would ask  employees if they  have 
any  relative who has a  medical license – such 
as a nurse, doctor,  pharmacist  or  dentist – 
and would be willing to take responsibility  for 
medical oversight  during dispensing.  While 
this may  seem  like an  odd approach,  it is one 
way  of locating additional  personnel who 
have medical licenses and are not already 
committed to serve in  another  capacity  in  a 
crisis. The goal is to locate all potential 
personnel who have,  can  maintain,  or  can 
reapply  for the ability  to handle medications. 
The MOU would not be signed unless this 
resource could be located. In  the worst-case 
scenario,  the LHD would provide medical 
staff for  medical  oversight.  However, the goal 
of this alternate mode of dispensing  is for  the 
LHD not to deploy any medical personnel.
Advantages of this dispensing alternative 
include the ability  to prophylax a  large 
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number  of individuals without  using  POD 
and the ability  to preserve scare clinical 
personnel resources. The disadvantages are 
the need to develop MOU, sorting through 
legal  ramifications, training  business staff, 
ensuring  that the proper  standards are met 
for  dispensing  prophylaxis,  and staffing  a 
warehouse distribution  center.  There is also 
the worry  that  businesses will  need clinical 
staff volunteers if they  are not  able  to locate 
their  own resources in  times of emergency. 
Most  states have very  strict  laws limiting  the 
dispensing  of medications to clinical staff and 
pharmacists so non-clinical  individual 
citizens are usually  prohibited from 
dispensing  medications,  even  under 
emergency  situations.46 If clinical staff (a  very 
limited resource)  needs to be provided by  the 
LHD, then  the advantages to using  the 
private sector are greatly diminished.
DISPENSING TO SHELTERED-IN 
POPULATIONS 
Sheltered-in  Populations (SIP) are defined as 
those populations that cannot  make it  to a 
POD. As seen  during  Katrina, the sheltered-
in  population  residing  in  nursing  homes, 
group homes,  and assisted living facilities can 
easily  be victimized when  staff abandons 
their  facilities to care for  themselves and their 
families.47  
The Oklahoma  City/County  Health 
Department developed a  SIP plan  that 
targeted jails,  nursing  homes, group homes, 
residential care, hospice, and home health 
care facilities. This plan  required minimum 
staffing  and security  and could still serve a 
significant portion  of this population. The 
program  also developed relationships with 
meals-on-wheels programs to distribute 
prophylaxis.   In  2006, there were 150 
facilities in  the registry  providing  prophylaxis 
to 250,000 people in  Oklahoma  County. 
During  an  exercise,  50,000 doses were given 
out in three hours using only  nine dispensing 
staff members and minimal security.48 
An advantage of leveraging  SIP facilities to 
serve as a mode of dispensing  is that  most  of 
these facilities are required by  law  to have 
medically  licensed staff on  hand.  Where this 
was not  the case in Oklahoma  City, the  health 
department looked to family  members of the 
resident  or  a  family  friend who had a  medical 
license and was willing  to take responsibility 
for  the given  facility.  While  this may  seem 
like an  odd approach,  it  was highly  successful 
in  Oklahoma  where they  were able  to find 
relatives of persons living in  the sheltered-in 
facilities who were willing  and able to take on 
the responsibilities of dispensing  in  each  of 
these venues. It  would be the responsibility  of 
this representative to dispense the drugs to 
the resident population  at  their  facility  and in 
every  case they  found a  representative.49 
Turning  to relatives of SIP residents met one 
of the goals of the planning  process: to locate 
local  medical  staff not committed to other 
response functions who can  be used in  a 
crisis situation.  
The biggest challenge Oklahoma  City 
encountered in  setting  up its SIP dispensing 
plan  was the creation  of a  registry, because 
finding their  target  agencies was very 
challenging.  The Oklahoma City/County 
Health  Department  worked closely  with  state 
agencies involved in licensing,  other  agencies 
that  deal with  the target  populations,  and 
even  resorted to using the phone book. The 
registry  included all locations of the target 
populations,  the number  of people living at 
each location,  and the number of staff 
working  there along  with  the members of 
their  immediate households. The registry  also 
identified a  single primary  and two secondary 
points of contact  during  an  emergency  to be 
notified of the location  of the SIP site.  These 
contacts were required to be licensed medical 
professionals.50 The registry  created another 
difficulty  because it requires constant 
updating  due to the high  turnover rate at  the 
targeted facilities. 51  Another  challenge was 
the development  of the MOU.  The higher-
level personnel at  each  agency  had to be 
actively  involved in  the mass prophylaxis 
discussion and many  of them  were reluctant 
because they  were under  the impression  that 
their  in-house physician  could provide the 
drugs needed during an emergency.52
DISPENSING AT COLLEGES/UNIVERSITIES 
College and university  health  centers in the 
United States provide low-cost  primary 
health  care to many  students nationwide. 
Nurse practitioners, registered nurses,  or 
physicians’ assistants usually  staff these 
health  centers and many  campuses are 
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affiliated with  medical schools.53 Colleges and 
universities have the infrastructure (large 
open  spaces for  dispensing such  as 
auditoriums or  basketball courts), medical 
staff, and non-clinical staff in  the form  of 
teachers as well as the student body  required 
to run  a  university-only  POD serving 
students,  faculty,  and staff (and their 
families).  It  would be the responsibility  of the 
university  to set  up,  staff, and operate a  POD 
with guidance available from the LHD.
An appropriate MOU must be developed 
between  the LHD and the university, 
verifying location and set-up of the university 
POD, staffing  for  the POD, and security  for 
the POD (which  may  be provided by  campus 
security  forces if available),  as well as 
delineating  the roles and responsibilities of 
each  organization. Universities with  an 
extremely  large student  body  may  require 
additional clinical staff from  the LHD to 
prophylax within  the forty-eight-hour 
timeframe.  Since some colleges and 
universities are state-run, LHD must consult 
their  state board of education  as well  as the 
university  management during  early  stages of 
planning.
One advantage of this system  is that, for 
certain colleges and universities,  it  would be 
possible  to prophylax  the entire campus 
population without recourse to any  additional 
resources (other  than  the prophylactic 
medications) from  either  the LHD or local 
security  forces.  Additionally, since colleges 
and universities represent  large social sub-
populations that  will need prophylaxis in  an 
e m e r g e n c y , p e r m i t t i n g o n - c a m p u s 
prophylaxis means a  large subpopulation  will 
be served that  no longer  needs to access 
transportation  services of any  kind. 
Disadvantages are that  the effort  of 
developing the MOU,  especially  if the state 
board of education  needs to become involved, 
may  be too substantial  given  the number  of 
individuals who would be prophylaxed.
DISPENSING AT MAJOR HOTEL CHAINS 
Most  major  metropolitan areas such  as Los 
Angeles,  Las Vegas,  and New  York not  only 
have large local populations but  must also 
deal with  a  fluctuating population  of tourist 
and business travelers.  Local health 
departments must be able to prophylax  this 
additional population to meet  the federal 
mandate. The Southern Nevada Health 
District  (SNHD),  which  includes Las Vegas, 
has over  300,000 tourists on  peak  days and 
adopted a  unique solution to deal with  its 
fluctuating  population.54  The SNHD 
partnered with  hotel and resort chains to set 
up closed POD to prophylax  employees and 
their  families as well  as all guests. This 
partnership was successful and both  parties 
were pleased with  its design. The partnership 
decreases the potential for  economic loss for 
the hotels and resorts by  safeguarding  their 
guests and staff, provides an  incentive for 
staff to return to work (by  providing  them 
with  prophylaxis),  and ensures continuity  of 
operations.  At  the same time,  the partnership 
allows the LHD to prophylax  the fluctuating 
and local population.55 
To make such  a  plan operational an  MOU 
between  the LHD and the hotel and resort 
chains would be required.  It  would be the 
responsibility  of the LHD to provide the hotel 
chains with proper  forms,  medications, and 
training of key  personnel involved in  the 
d i s p e n s i n g  p r o c e s s . I t w o u l d t h e 
responsibility  of the hotel  and resort chains 
to set  up and run  the POD and provide all 
medical and non-medical  staff required for 
dispensing; they  would also have to 
demonstrate the availability  of space and 
staff before the MOU could be signed. Hotel 
and resort  chains often  have an  occupational 
nurse on  staff for issues such as workers 
comp or  may  choose to contract with  an 
industrial health  clinic, local nursing  float 
pool, or a  medical consultant firm.  The non-
medical staff would be taken  from  the 
existing hotel staff.
The advantage of this mode of dispensing 
is that it  reaches a  population  that may 
otherwise have difficulties finding  and 
traveling to a  regular  POD. In addition,  no 
additional clinical or  non-clinical  staff would 
need to be provided by  the LHD in  an 
emergency.  The primary  disadvantage would 
be the amount of effort  required to develop 
MOU with  large hotel  chains and settle 
liability  issues within  the MOU.  While MOU 
are required in  all  dispensing  options, some 
are more difficult and time-consuming  to 
establish than others.
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DISPENSING THROUGH LARGE HEALTH 
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS 
Health  maintenance organizations (HMO) 
are a  type of a  managed care organization 
that  provides both  health  insurance and 
health  services. In  the Denver  Metro Area  a 
unique relationship has developed between 
the LHD and Kaiser  Permanente, the largest 
health  care provider  in  the area. Kaiser 
Permanente typically  conducts a  drive-thru 
flu  clinic in  the area and therefore has 
experience in  mass prophylaxis. Kaiser 
Permanente also has the clinical and non-
clinical  staff to support  mass prophylaxis as 
well  as the location  and partnerships to set up 
a  drive-thru  POD.  The MOU between  the 
LHD and Kaiser  Permanente  states that  the 
LHD is responsible  for  providing Kaiser 
Permanente with  prophylactic  medications 
and forms. It  would be the responsibility  of 
Kaiser Permanente to dispense medications 
to their  members and employees (and 
families of employees) only. 
Advantages of this mode of dispensing  are 
that  it requires no clinical  or  non-clinical staff 
from  the LHD,  there is a  potential that the 
HMO could also provide their  own  trucks and 
drivers for  medication  retrieval from  the 
warehouse, and people are familiar  with  and 
trust their  HMO for  medical assistance.  Also, 
health  maintenance organizations are often 
sizable employers in  addition to having  large 
numbers of members, which  can  significantly 
lessen the number of individuals seeking care 
from  the POD. The only  disadvantage is the 
amount  of effort  required to set up an  MOU 
that  clearly  delineates the responsibilities of 
each entity. 
DOOR-TO-DOOR DISPENSING 
The 2004  MOU between DHHS and the 
United States Postal  Service (USPS),  known 
as the postal  plan, states that the USPS  would 
suspend mail  delivery  during  an  emergency 
and bring medicine directly  to homes.56  This 
option would only  be available to areas 
designated as Cities Readiness Initiative 
(CRI)  areas based on  population  and 
geographic location.57  As of 2006  there are 
seventy-two CRI areas in  the United States.58 
The postal plan  is subject  to availability  of 
resources and funding  and is entirely 
voluntary on part of the USPS. 59 
In  this mode of dispensing,  postal 
employees would deliver  a single bottle of 
doxycycline to each  household, to provide 
individuals with  the first  dose and prevent 
initial  surge at  POD and giving  LHD the time 
to gather  resources.  On  November  11, 2006, 
postal employees delivered empty  cardboard 
boxes and information  flyers to residents in 
certain Seattle neighborhoods.  During  the 
nine-hour  exercise,  forty-one postal 
employees accompanied by  armed police 
officers delivered medications to 38,000 
households. Based on  the average household 
size in  Seattle,  (2.05  people),  the LHD could 
have initially  kept 77,900 people (15  percent 
of the population) away from POD. 60 
In  non-CRI cities, other  resources might 
be utilized.  In  Chesapeake, Virginia,  the LHD 
partnered with  school  districts to accomplish 
the task of prophylaxing  its population  of 
218,000.  Using school buses, bus drivers, 
escort  vehicles,  and eight medical personnel, 
the LHD dispensed medication  to 1,100 
individuals in  less than two hours driving 
door  to door.  The receipt  was confirmed by  a 
phone call into an automated system  that 
kept track  of the delivery  via  geographic 
information  system  (GIS). The Chesapeake 
Health  Department now  plans to prophylax 
their  entire population using  200 school 
buses and with  help from  local  Community 
Emergency  Response Teams (CERT) and the 
Medical  Reserve Corps (MRC).61  Similarly, 
LHD could choose to contract with  UPS, 
FedEx or  DHL to provide door-to-door 
delivery.  All major  delivery  service providers 
have a  logistic  infrastructure that  includes 
personnel, GIS tracking,  and route planning 
software.
The main  disadvantage to this mode of 
dispensing  is the security  requirements. 
However,  the Presidential Executive Order 
s i g n e d b y  B a r a k O b a m a  c a l l s f o r 
supplementing  local law  enforcement 
personnel with  local  federal  law  enforcement 
officers as well as other  appropriate 
personnel to escort  postal workers delivering 
prophylactic drugs. 62 
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DRIVE-THRU POD 
Drive-thru  POD originally  gained popularity 
as a  mechanism  to deliver  influenza 
prophylaxis to the elderly. A  review  of the 
program  in  the post-9/11  era  determined that 
the program  could be used to provide 
personal protec t ive equipment  and 
prophylaxis to the population  while 
maintaining  some form  of isolation.  The 
drive-thru  POD have a  simple set  up: patients 
drive  to the site and,  while in their  car, 
receive informed consent,  have a  brief history 
taken  (to prevent  contraindications),  and 
then  receive immunization  without leaving 
the vehicle. 63
Drive-thru  POD should be located close to 
major roads, highways,  or  freeways in  order 
to prevent traffic  jams.  It  is strongly 
recommended that the ingress and egress 
points be large enough  to allow  multiple 
lanes of traffic.  Similarly, the location should 
be large enough  to accommodate multiple 
lanes for dispensing.64
The Orlando Health  Department plan  calls 
for  ten  lanes of dispensing  to ensure a  high 
throughput  and to prevent overflow  of traffic 
onto neighboring  streets.65  They  predict  a 
reduction in  the number  of staff needed 
(compared to the traditional POD) and 
anticipate prophylaxing 60  percent  of their 
population using this method.66 
The main  advantage of drive-thru  POD is 
that  they  are regularly  used as flu  vaccination 
clinics each  year. Space requirements are 
much  more dynamic  and are not  bound by 
the strict  constraints of traditional POD.  In 
terms of security, law  enforcement agencies 
have stated that they  find it  much  easier to 
control  traffic at  a  drive-thru  POD than  at  a 
traditional POD. 67  Another  advantage to 
using  drive-thru  POD is that  the environment 
within  the car  can  be climate controlled, 
hence protecting  the population  from 
extreme heat or cold. 
There are some disadvantages to using  a 
drive-thru  POD.  The POD staff is exposed to 
the weather  conditions and the LHD is still 
responsible for  providing all POD staff. 
Drive-thru  POD would be limited to daytime 
operations and the LHD must plan  to remove 
cars that  break down or  run  out of gas.  There 
is also an  increased risk  of careless or 
panicked drivers, road rage, and carbon 
monoxide/dioxide exposure.
DISPENSING THROUGH RETAIL 
PHARMACIES 
Private sector  pharmacies,  located at  retail 
stores, wholesale markets, and stand-alone 
buildings, could also be a potential  partner 
for  health  departments during  a  public  health 
emergency  requiring mass prophylaxis. There 
is a  retail pharmacy  within five miles of 95 
percent  of the US population. 68 Every  year, 
large retail  stores with  pharmacies and 
private pharmacy  chains conduct influenza 
vaccination  clinics at  their  facilities. Some of 
these conduct their  vaccination  campaigns 
internally, whereas others contract  with 
private community-based health  service 
providers to organize  their  campaign and 
provide the vaccination service.69 Twenty-five 
to thirty  million  doses, accounting for  one-
third of the nation’s flu  vaccine,  were 
administered by  retail store/wholesale store 
pharmacies and private chain pharmacies.70
Many  private retail companies would be 
willing to work  closely  with  the LHD during 
m a s s p r o p h y l a x i s . D r .  O n o r a  L i e n 
interviewed executives from  various grocery 
store retail  pharmacies and pharmacies 
located within  chain  wholesale clubs and they 
were almost undivided in  their  endorsement 
and interest in  planning for  and responding 
t o a p u b l i c h e a l t h  e m e r g e n c y .71 
Representatives from  these businesses noted 
that although  they  were a “for-profit” 
business there was a  “strong connection 
between  assisting  during  an  emergency  and 
maintaining  or  improving their  reputation 
within the community.” 72
Advantages of this mode of dispensing  are 
that  no staff would be required from  the LHD 
and many  pharmacies have ample outdoor 
parking  as well as the indoor  space to 
accommodate a  large number  of people and 
maintain  their normal operations. In 
addition, pharmacies have electronic 
inventory  systems to receive and manage SNS 
inventory,  a  secure location  to store drugs, 
medical staff to meet  federal and state 
dispensing  requirements, and non-medical 
staff who can  serve essential functions during 
the dispensing process. 73
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An MOU needs to be established with  the 
pharmacy  chain  and potentially  with  each 
individual pharmacy.  Due to a  large number 
of pharmacies in any  area,  it  is necessary  to 
consider  geospatial analysis and find optimal 
locations such  as areas without  POD,  areas 
with  low  security  concerns, and areas with  a 
moderate population density. 
CHOOSING AMONG THE 
ALTERNATIVE MODES OF 
DISPENSING
There are several  alternate modes of 
dispensing  available for  local health 
departments.  However, each  alternative 
requires a  substantial amount of effort to be 
able to implement  it.  This represents a 
serious additional workload at  a  time when 
most LHD are understaffed to run their  daily 
functions. 74  Most  LHD will not be able to 
pursue all  of these options.  Therefore,  it 
becomes necessary  to choose among  them. 
Table 1  summarizes the advantages and 
disadvantages of each  alternate mode of 
dispensing. 
The optimal choice  for  a  LHD will be 
determined by  a  number  of different 
variables depending on  the relative 
importance of speed of dispensing, 
population reached, security,  and staffing 
requirements. Additionally, the LHD must 
take into account  the costs and political 
ramifications associated with  the alternate 
modes of dispensing  as well as the specific 
legal quandaries raised by  the alternate 













Closed No No Low Low Ensures staff for POD and hospitals 
is ready prior to mass prophylaxis
Dispensing at 
businesses




Closed No No Medium Low Without special assistance this 
population may not otherwise be 
able to receive prophylaxis.
Dispensing at 
c o l l e g e s /
universities
Closed Maybe No Medium Medium Implementation becomes easier if 
there is a campus environment
Dispensing at 
hotels
Closed Maybe No Low Medium Effectively deals with the non-local 
population (business and tourist)
Dispensing at 
HMO
Closed No No Low High Only provide prophylaxis to those 
having a particular health insurance
Door- to -door 
dispensing
Open No No High High Voluntary program that currently 
requires a large security component
D r i v e - t h r u 
dispensing
Open Yes Yes Medium Medium Savings in terms of staffing are 
small, speed of dispensing is slower
Dispensing at 
pharmacies
Open No No Medium Medium Convenient locations and strong 
bond with community
Open – anyone may receive prophylaxis
Closed – prophylaxis is only available to a specific subpopulation
Table 1. Comparison of Alternate Modes of Dispensing
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Costs associated with  alternate modes of 
dispensing  break down  into two major 
subcategories: preplanning  costs and 
implementation costs.  Preplanning costs are 
those associated with  setting up an  option, 
whereas implementation costs those incurred 
when  the option  is implemented during an 
emergency.  Both  costs can  be difficult  to 
define, estimate,  or  measure and may  include 
work-hours lost to the project,  employee 
salary  and benefits, contractor  fees,  and 
travel.  Although  cost  of implementation may 
be overlooked during  an emergency,  it  is very 
unlikely  that  public  and private partners 
would ignore the need to estimate both  types 
of costs during the preplanning phase. 
By  partnering with  other  agencies, LHD 
make the problem  of mass prophylaxis a 
community-oriented problem  and private 
partners may  fill gaps that LHD cannot. 
However,  especially  when using  closed 
models of dispensing, LHD may  be accused 
of favoritism  for exercising  one option  and 
not the other. 
There are several legal issues, liability  (tort 
and workers compensation)  in  particular, 
that  may  hinder  the implementation  of any 
mass prophylaxis plan. Chester  Lee Smith, 
from  the Georgia  Division of Public Health, 
hosted several  meetings with  BENS members 
and their  legal representatives between 
October 2003  and January  2007. During 
these meetings it  emerged that  the liability 
issue was of great  concern  to all  potential 
partners in  the private sector.75  Private 
partners must  also consider  that insurance 
companies may  refuse to cover  claims 
resulting  from  injuries, as dispensing 
medications is not  a  part  of their  normal 
operations. 76 
The government  has made significant 
strides in  alleviating  some of these concerns 
by  passing the Public Readiness and 
Emergency  Preparedness (PREP) Act in 
2005, which,  when issued by  the secretary  of 
the Department  of Health  and Human 
Services,  provides immunity  from  tort 
liability  (except  for  willful misconduct) for 
both  the administration  and use of 
countermeasures. 77 The federal  government 
as also instituted the Volunteer  Protection 
Act of 1997, 78 but  many  feel that  this act has 
too many  loopholes to be effective and states 
have the  ability  to opt  out  of the act  entirely. 
This raises the issue that  states do not  have a 
uniform  approach to the issues of liability. 
Most states have a  range of legislation 
surrounding  “Good Samaritan”  laws,  but  the 
strength  and coverage of these laws varies 
from  state to state and is very  confusing. 79 
The BENS members at  these meetings 
recommended new  legislation  or  changes in 
current legislation  such  as the states’ “Good 
Samaritan”  laws that  would protect  them 
from  legal liability  and litigation  occurring 
from  incidental injuries but  not from  willful 
negligence. 80 
CONCLUSION
Many  LHD may  find it  extremely  difficult  to 
prophylax  their  entire population  within 
forty-eight  hours using  only  their  POD 
because of staffing,  security, and site 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  c o n c e r n s . L o c a l  h e a l t h 
departments could open  more POD, but this 
would not resolve the issue because the 
number  of POD is directly  correlated to the 
requisite number  of resources.  The Trust  for 
America’s Health  determined that  “ensuring 
the public can  quickly  and safely  receive 
medicat ions dur ing  a  major  heal th 
emergency  is one of the most  serious 
challenges facing  public  health  officials”  and 
that  many  states still  do not  have viable 
means of addressing  volunteer  staffing 
issues.81  Considering  that  resources will 
always be under  pressure it  becomes 
necessary  for  public  health  officials to 
consider  alternate modes of dispensing. 82 
This implies that  LHD will need to conduct 
analyses to determine the best alternate 
modes of dispensing for  their  jurisdictions. 
This is a  difficult  task  since each  mode of 
dispensing  has a  unique set  of advantages 
and disadvantages.
As a  starting  point, each  LHD needs to 
make a  realistic  assessment  of how  many 
traditional POD it  will  be able to make 
operational  in  a  few  hours time. This will 
allow  the LHD to determine the amount of 
unmet  need. Workshops or  tabletop exercises 
designed specifically  to evaluate total  system 
response capacity  and capacity  resource 
requirements would be a  good starting  point 
to make this assessment. Traditional 
exercises such  as those listed in  the HSEEP 
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guidance are operationally  focused either  as 
functional exercises – such  as running one or 
a  couple of dispensing  options for  a short 
period of time – or  simulating  actual 
responses to a  mock incident  or  conducting 
discussions (workshops, games, tabletops) 
with a similar focus.
 While helpful,  these exercises do not 
focus on  the total  response effort  required, 
typically  assuming  perfect  scalability. While 
the HSEEP evaluation  methodology  could 
still  be used as a  means of evaluating the 
workshops/tabletop exercises,  the exercises 
themselves would need to be refocused to 
assess the total response effort  required. Only 
by  doing  a complete systems analysis of all  of 
the planned response elements within  the 
health  department’s jurisdiction will a solid 
assessment  of the degree to which  the 
public’s needs are met by  the response plan 
become apparent.  This analysis must also 
include the total  response requirements for 
each  entity  involved in  the plan  (health 
department,  security/law  enforcement, 
government, transportation,  community 
partners). For these efforts,  it  is critical to 
b r i n g t o g e t h e r  L H D s t a f f ,  h e a l t h 
professionals,  government officials,  police 
and other  law  enforcement  personnel,  their 
response plans,  and the assumptions that 
each agency  makes about  the actions, 
capability,  and availability  of the other 
agencies. The discussions will need to center 
around these assumptions and their  realism 
as well  as the total  response effort needed to 
meet the federal mandates.  
After  such  a  workshop/tabletop exercise, a 
realistic  picture  of the constraints within the 
community  should become apparent. 
Important  questions include estimates of the 
number  of sites required and the staffing 
needed to support  all  of these sites; the 
quantity  of medical professionals that have 
been  double counted; estimates on the 
number  of law  enforcement  personnel who 
will  be committed to tasks ensuring an 
orderly  society  (and not  available to a 
dispensing  operations); logistics of deploying 
large numbers of non-medical volunteers; 
logistics of on-the-spot credentialing  of 
medical personnel  who spontaneously 
volunteer; availability  (and timeliness) of 
using assets from  the National Guard, 
military  bases, police academies,  etc; and the 
suitability  and logistics of the POD sites that 
are not  within  the top ranked choices.   Given 
this information, the LHD can consider what 
aspects of their  POD plan are most  in  need of 
supplementation  – sites,  security,  staffing, 
throughput, locations, etc.  – so that  the 
relative importance of addressing the 
different criteria becomes clearer. 
Once the gap analyses have been 
completed,  and resource needs and their 
relative importance/priority  determined, the 
next question  is how  to best remedy  these 
needs.  The decision  makers for  each 
jurisdiction, potentially  the local health 
department or  other emergency  response 
agencies or  a  consortia  of response agencies, 
need to choose, in  concert with  their 
community  partners,  what  combination of 
POD and alternate modes of dispensing  best 
meet the needs of the population  within their 
jurisdiction. Table 1, adapted and expanded 
to reflect the specific  details of the 
jurisdiction is a  good starting  point for 
building  an  augmented system.  If too many 
options are available in  a  given jurisdiction, 
or  if the preferences and priorities vary 
widely  between community  partners,  tools 
from  the field of decision analysis,  such  as 
multi-criteria  decision-making,  can  facilitate 
the analysis and subsequent discussion 
necessary  to make well-informed choices. 
The Los Angeles County  Department  of 
Public  Health  conducted such  an  analysis for 
two types of dispensing situations.83   This 
research  provides a  template for  the analysis 
but  the results will necessarily  vary  by 
jurisdiction  and the specific  needs and gaps 
identified in each case.
Areas of future research should include 
full  systems analyses of a  jurisdiction’s 
response capability  showing  how  an 
integrated approach  could provide potential 
solutions to existing  capability  and staffing 
limitations.  Ideally  this would include 
analyses for  jurisdictions of different sizes 
and geographical locations to see if there are 
any  global best practices or  combinations 
that  appear  to work  best  with  certain  types of 
localities or geographical features or 
population demographics.  
There are many  options for expanding 
mass prophylaxis dispensing, each  with  its 
own  particular  set  of benefits and drawbacks. 
It is of utmost importance to have a realistic 
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sense of potential areas with  resource 
constraints if the jurisdiction  relies solely  on 
the traditional POD system. The key  is to 
evaluate the overall  system  from  all response 
partners’ perspectives to ensure that plans 
can  be translated into reality  in  a  full 
response situation.  Only  this type of holistic 
analysis will  reveal limitations within  the 
current policy.  It  is important for government 
agencies at  various levels to realize that  a 
“one size fits all”  approach  is likely  to fall 
short  given the incredible diversity  in  our 
cities and states. It  is equally  important  for 
individual jurisdictions to thoughtfully  assess 
their  individual  situations and decide, once 
the constraints in  a  particular jurisdiction are 
identified,  which  alternate modes of 
d ispensing can  be pursued to best 
supplement  the system. Only  once this is 
done can  the local  health  departments be 
assured they  are providing the best  service 
possible to the public that relies on them.
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